Reluctant Empire Buildres? Not So Much So... An Athenian View on the Necessity of Empire

Reluctant Empire Builders? Not so much soÐ'... an Athenian View on the Necessity of Empire

Did ancient Athens need an empire? That depends on who you ask. In the first book of Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War, the Athenian point of view concerning relations with other Greek cities and city-states is related twice. The first time is in 432 B.C.E., when three Athenian representatives speak up during a conference at Sparta after arguments against Athens have been heard from the Corinthians and Spartans. The Athenians are not diplomats or official representatives, but happen to be present during the debate concerning the problems of the Athenian empire, and they ask to speak in defense of their native city. The second discussion comes when Thucydides describes the details of how the Athenian empire grew in the aftermath of the Persian War, fighting on land and sea to gain new territories. In this essay, the two versions of events will be compared for their insights into the Athenian identity, and in particular at the pride that Athenians felt in their military ability and democratic system of government.

The Athenian representatives begin by declaring that they are reasonable men who interrupt the debate in the interest of peace and reason. Speaking as one, the Athenians say there is no reason to speak to disagreements and problems in the past, but they must be allowed to speak about their city's proud role in the Persian War. With this opening, they launch immediately into a description of the glorious part Athens played in that conflict, which save all the people of Greece from the invading Persian forces. Their speech reads like a short list of the most important contributions to the victory:

This is our record. At Marathon we stood out against the Persians and faced them single-handed. In the later invasion, when we were unable to meet the enemy on land, we and all our people took to the ships, and joined in the battle at Salamis. It was this battle that prevented the Persians from sailing against the Peloponnese and destroying the cities one by one; for no system of mutual defence could have been organized in the face of the Persian naval superiority.1

On these points, the Athenians are undoubtedly correct. Athenians did put up the heroic resistance at Marathon, and they did play the major role in the great naval battle at Salamis which smashed the Persian fleet and saved Greece. History records that Athens did provide most of the ships and the most capable of the generals and soldiers. And the Athenians did all this after abandoning their own city to the Persians, fighting on even though they had already lost everything.

The proud Athenians demand not only that the Spartans concede their "courage, resolution and ability," but charge them with not putting in an appearance in the war until the Athenians had lost everything. They argue that the Spartans, by refusing to fight on to the end against the Persians, compelled Athens to take on that role and assume the empire that came with it. The Delian League, formed in 478 as an alliance against Persia, assumed the form of an empire as the Athenians began using force to prevent any of their "allies" from withdrawing from the League. Then they point out that Sparta also has its own empire, ruling other states on the Peloponnesus, and arranging the affairs of those states to suit themselves. They ask whether it is right for the Hellenes to repay the heroic Athenians with such ingratitude. Next they offer a few words in defense of their imperial policy. The Athenian empire was not really gained by force, they suggest, but was created when the other allies came and begged Athens to lead them.

The justification for keeping and controlling this empire of cities and states is ironic in some ways. According to the Athenian representatives, the growth of their empire caused them to become first feared, and then hated. By the time the Athenians were aware of the hostile intentions of their neighbors, it was too late to let go of power: "...at that point it was clearly no longer safe for us to risk letting our empire go, especially as any allies that left us would go over to you."2 In other words, the good Athenians might have considered freeing their allied cities, but the Spartans and others were already so hostile to them that it would not have been safe to do so.

The pride of these people becomes even more evident in the next passage where the representatives claim that the Athenians have done nothing "contrary to human nature," since it is natural for the strong to subdue the weak and the powerful to control the powerless. Now the Spartans are speaking of "right and wrong" in empire-building, and forgetting that the Athenians are more liberal and tolerant of their imperial subjects than other empires like Sparta. For example, Athenian subjects, although not citizens in the fullest sense, are supposedly treated as equals and given free access to the Athenian courts. It is natural for subject peoples to resent the more powerful and wealthy Athenians, but in any case they have to submit to them. Finally, the representatives complain that the Spartans are not behaving like the good allies who fought against the Persians. Their militaristic "regulated way of life" is not suited to other Greeks who prefer freedom and democracy.

The concluding remarks of the Athenians are most interesting as they combine a plea for peace with a solemn warning against those who would make war. They ask their listeners to take their time and think over their decision, because the loud complaints of Athens' imperial subjects are not really any of their affair. As if this were not enough, they remind them of the "great part played by the unpredictable in war."3 In closing, they ask to settle all differences by arbitration, as required by their treaty, rather than a rash declaration of war.

The Athenian speech is effective, but it is an idealized defense of the Athenian position with regard to their empire. They won it fairly, govern it justly, and will not surrender it without a fight. At least one of the listeners, King Archidamus, seems to be persuaded that the Spartans should negotiate rather than simply declare war on Athens. His speech seems reasonable, but Archidamus defends caution and hesitation, which were not considered virtues in ancient warfare. Thucydides reveals very little of his personal feelings concerning the truth or justice of all these remarks, but it is plain from his depiction of the two sides that the Athenians are more clever and bold than the plodding Spartans. The Spartans, of course, are formidable in war, where their martial discipline and physical strength serve them well, but

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