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What Role Did Military Intelligence Play in World War Ii?

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What role did military intelligence play in World War II?

What role did military intelligence play in World War II?

Joseph Reeder

It is undeniable the principal role, military intelligence occupied in both the successes and failures of the main events that transpired in World War II, ranging from the breaking of the enigma code at Bletchley Park, to the D Day landings that arguably determined the outcome of the whole war. Military intelligence in the war encompasses not only spies and counterintelligence but also radar, signal, weather and mapping intelligence. Having preemptive knowledge via military intelligence, enabled both the Axis and Allies to preplan their attacks with maximum efficiency; reducing casualties and achieving the necessary objectives tactically, operationally and strategically. Basically military intelligence paved the way for victory on the battlefield. The functionary position played within this specific tasking also revealed an increased sense of danger when venturing behind enemy lines to collect vital information. Knowing the terrain was essential when it comes to attacks from air, land and sea. Sun Tzu in his Ð''Art of War' emphasizes this critical point by revealing how the combatants who know the area and employ scouts effectively will have more success via greater mobility and awareness of what lies in their wake; "one who does not know the topography of mountains and forests, ravines and defiles, wetlands and marshes cannot maneuver the army. One who does not employ local guides will not secure advantages of terrain". The landscape can not only be used against the enemy with positioning increasing efficiency of weapons, it can also be utilized for cover, avoiding traps and ensuring paratroops will land on safe ground, as was the case on D day. However it is true what Clausewitz relays in Ð''On War', that terrain would "be of no influence at all on an engagement fought over a flat, uncultivated plain", yet he also discerns that "Among civilized nations combat uninfluenced by its surroundings and the nature of the ground is hardly conceivable". The latter defined the nature of WWII with its multiplicities of conflicts between the civilized societies of the world.

Military disasters occur consistently if a side is unprepared for an attack either offensively or defensively; Pearl Harbour was a prime example of this and will be discussed later. If an army cannot assemble in time to produce a counterattack then the battle is already over even if the antagonist is technologically weaker. The weapons systems become nullified as disorganization among the ranks creates chaos leading to an inevitable loss. Spies, double agents, and resistance groups engaged in the purpose of cutting off enemy supply lines and breaking communication, played one of the most decisive roles within military intelligence throughout the war. The former spread confusion and deception amongst the ranks of the command systems not only counteracting sabotage and subversion but also collecting military information that had a critical impact on the war, such as the enigma machine and corresponding codes. Espionage and counterespionage was at the pinnacle of finesse in the turmoil of chaos that exuded from war, yet entailed an unhinged risk for the participants and informants.

Military intelligence wasn't just confined within certain regions; it was spread out between many powers such as Russia, Germany, the US, Japan and the United Kingdom to name a few. The latter's intelligence prowess was questionable as Hughes Wilson emphatically states; "the Enigma story was not a triumph of British skill and intellect: the Poles broke Enigma and the French gave it to the British". However, it is undeniable that the British provided the means and technology for the code to be broken with the establishment of the Bletchley Park as the breeding ground for advanced military code breaking and intelligence. Continuing along this theme the German U-boats were a force to be reckoned with in World War II inciting fear throughout the Atlantic shipping lines and trade routes. This form of underwater naval warfare motivated the allies to readdress their entire trading defense routines formulating the convoy system as their first counter measure to this incessant problem. The wireless technology prevalent at the time allowed for Bletchley Park to intercept the various enigma codes. It was the laziness of German operators according to Keegan in his Intelligence in War that enabled Bletchley Park to crack some of the German signals directing their movements. "Bletchley called two forms of mistake made by German operators Ð'- each was the product of laziness". He continues to emphasize the difference the cracking of the intercepts made when it came to preparing for a major attack. "The red intercepts and decrypts were of vital importance during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz that followed it". Knowing the location of the intended targets in the bombing of Britain meant it was possible for the zones to be evacuated, minimizing civilian casualties and protecting valuable military technology. Signals Intelligence was in fact more beneficial in air warfare as this was where the most traffic was generated; the U boats tended to be much more clandestine in their maneuvers and the change of keys only worsened matters. Howard indicates it was after "Bletchley achieved a decisive breakthrough in December 1942" that the Allies were victorious in Battle of the Atlantic in the summer of 1943. However, attaining the cyphers for German air and naval operations did not impact the Allied success in the war nearly as much as the cracking at Bletchley of the hand and machine cyphers used by the Abwehr, exposing the sheer bulk of traffic leading to the MI5's control of "80 per cent of the German espionage network in the United Kingdom". This essentially facilitated an increase in counterespionage efficiency.

Keegan writes how Sir Harry Himsley; one of the official British military intelligence historians on the Second World War downplays the importance of his chosen field in the course of the war stating that "it did not, Ð'..... ,win the war, but it did shorten it". This disposition on military intelligence is dubious at best, as the intelligence campaigns waged on the U-Boats led to the freedom of British trading which the country relied on to capacitate their contribution to the war effort. Keegan is agreeable in his belief that if not for Britain's ability "to survive U-boat attack on its oceanic supply", "Hitler would have completed his conquest of Western Europe, perhaps

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