Mao and Peasant Army 1927-1928

Mao's first attempt to prove the validity of the peasants potential for revolution was in the city of Changsha, during the Autumn Harvest Uprising of September of 1927. The uprising took place during the harvesting period to intensify the class struggles in the village. Mao had realized the revolutionary potential of the peasant class because the peasants, who were the most exploited class, had already begun revolting against the ruthless economic exploitation that they were subjected to by the petty bourgeoisie, the warlords and landlord classes. Consequently, Mao rallied the peasants and organized a small army and which he led during the Hunan movement. This army was quite successful and it captured several cities in the Yangtse region, in a revolutionary peasant explosion. During the Autumn Harvest Uprising, the peasant army violently attacked and caused radical upheaval for several weeks and the landowning classes of the entire province trembled in the wake of these attacks. This continued until the peasant army was repressed at Changsha within a week of its initial attack. According to Jerome Ch'en, the failure of the uprising resulted from the inexperience of the peasant forces compounded with the fact that the situation of China had changed since Mao's Investigation into the Peasant Movement eight months earlier. Chiang Kai-Shek's White Terror had entered the countryside and Mao's army was easily ambushed and slaughtered. Although the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising resulted in the deaths of most of the peasant army, for Mao, the deaths were an acceptable consequence because he believed that the peasants were the key to the successful transition of China towards the utopian ideal of communism. This failure gave Mao an opportunity to reevaluate the ideas in his Hunan report and resulted in the development of the five conditions as expressed by Benjamin Schwartz; Mao's Strategy. This strategy reorganized the peasant masses into a formidable army, which maximized the peasants' revolutionary potential. This event also marked the point of departure of Mao's thought and contributed to his reinterpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Mao reinterpreted Marxist-Leninist thought to suit China's historical conditions. Thus, the Hunan Movement and its unexpected disintegration after the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising of 1927 were essential for the development of Mao's strategy which led to the formation of a the Red army that would eventually lead China to communism, and even determined Mao's future relations during the communist era in China between Mao, the party and the people.

In 1927, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had been forced into the countryside, which effectively separated the party from the urban proletariat. So the communist party embarked on an experiment in the most forsaken parts of China, southern Kiangsi, in an attempt to accelerate the progress of China's evolution to communism. In Hunan in 1927, the peasants were in a constant state of active rebellion against the capitalist oppressors hence the roots of the modern agrarian revolution in China were born. Mao was sent to Hunan, his native province, to conduct an investigation on behalf of the peasant committee of the CCP and in March of 1927 he published the Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement. Although Mao had sent the report back to the committee, he did not wait for the communist party to decide whether or not he should organize the peasant masses into a revolutionary army. Instead, Mao gathered his small army and led them during the Hunan movement until they were devastated at Changsha. Mao barely escaped capture and returned to Hunan to regroup and think of how he could refine the ideas in his Hunan report further so that the peasant masses could be organized more effectively.

Like Lenin, Mao believed that revolution in China meant agrarian revolution. However in the Leninist ideology peasants are only necessary as a means to drive a state through the bourgeoisie revolution and advance the state into a socio-democratic state. Therefore, the peasants could not be the vanguards of socialist revolution because they lacked the political consciousness necessary of the class that leads the revolution; the urban proletariat. The Soviets', who were trying to direct China's evolution to communism, were encouraging the Communist Party to use the peasants specifically for the purpose of driving the socio-democratic revolution. However, despite Russia's efforts to guide China's socialist evolution, China's conditions in 1927 were such that the communist party was almost completely disconnected from the urban proletariat and there was no way to determine when the relationship between the party and proletariat would be reestablished. Mao didn't think it was necessary to wait for an indeterminate time before the socialist revolution could take place. Although the peasants according to Marxist-Leninist thought do not have the political consciousness that is necessary in the proletariat, Mao reasoned that because the party was exiled to the countryside, the party would be remiss if they missed the opportunity to utilize the peasant masses as a tool for the revolution. The consciousness that Marxist-Leninism dictates is necessary for socialist change according to Mao is already present in the party. Consequently, Mao's interpretation places the party as the vanguard of revolution. By substituting the party for the absent urban proletariat, the problems that Leninists anticipated were circumvented and China was able to leap from bourgeoisie revolution to socialism. Although this idea was contradictory to Marxist-Leninist ideology, Mao firmly believed that this was an achievable goal.

The role of the peasants, in Mao's model of socialist thought, is to form a mass base that can be organized into an army. This army can then carry out the necessary Bolshevik revolution to bring about socialist revolution. From the lessons learned during the Autumn Harvest Uprisings, Mao realized that military strength was key. So the development of a strong mass base was of utmost importance. The peasant masses are the logical group for Mao because of the large numbers in the countryside where the party is and their discontent with the petty bourgeoisie, which means they have no loyalty to the capitalist class. Mao believes that the best means to entice the masses is to share wealth with them. He then begins a program of land reform that is designed to satisfy the basic grievances of the masses first within the soviet base and then spreading outwards in areas that end up under communist control. So the peasants were lured by the promise of the transference of political power into the hands of peasant associations and the confiscation and distribution of land belonging

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