Hyperwar

Hyperwar

In World War Two, Hitler's armies began to use a technique that involved high speed armored mechanized divisions in conjunction with heavy air support to disrupt enemy formations. Ironically, America nicknamed this type of battle style "blitzkrieg," or lightning war (Fanning, 283). Since then, many countries have adopted this type of battle style because of its extreme effectiveness.

The German populace in the early stages of the war experienced a huge moral boost due to the initial success of the German blitzkrieg in Poland and France. Hitler, realizing the demoralization the Germans had suffered as a result of World War One, used the victories to revitalize German morale and consolidate his own power.

In contrast, during Vietnam, heavy, but ineffectual air bombardment supported foot soldiers without the use of the armored mechanized divisions. In general, the war was fought without the high speed movement that would come to characterize later wars. The Vietcong were allowed to fight a war on their own terms, while American forces failed to establish any specific objective. The lack of any grand strategy made it impossible to achieve goals because none existed. Because of this, the Vietnam conflict dragged on for years to the overall negative reaction of the American people.

In Operation Desert Storm, Iraq's armies were overwhelmed by the speed, maneuverability, and technological efficiency of Coalition armies. The Persian Gulf "Conflict" lasted less than one year. Due to this brevity, and the overwhelming success of the operation, the American public showed major support for the forces in the Persian Gulf. The same is true for the style of attack that recently occurred in the Middle East. This was a true war as more than one thousand battle deaths were incurred on both sides of the conflict. However, the majority of these were Iraqis. A very recent Gallup pole showed that 76% of Americans favor the current conflict in Iraq (Gallup 2003, American Opinion).

The use of high speed armored mechanized divisions in conjunction with heavy air support to disrupt enemy formations and achieve a specific objective will henceforth be referred to as hyperwar. The three afore-mentioned military conflicts show insight as to the future of war. By examining public reaction, the costs of war, and the effectiveness of hyperwar, it will be shown that current blitzkrieg techniques will not decrease the likelihood of conventional warfare occurrences, and that furthermore, most forms of conventional warfare in the future will take the form of Hyperwar.

In his article entitled, "The Origin of the Term 'Blitzkrieg': Another View," William J. Fanning, Jr. writes that the term blitzkrieg was coined not by Germany, but by Western journalists in response to the lighting attacks in Poland. The first time the term was used anywhere in the world was in American periodicals.

Bryan Perrett's A History of Blitzkrieg simply shows the evolution of hyperwar and therefore its effectiveness. With the utilization of tank divisions and heavy air support, the pace of war sped up. The successful operation of blitzkrieg techniques began to see a drop, albeit slow, in the rate of human casualties, which was eagerly received by the public on both sides of the conflict.

From Lexington to Desert Storm and Beyond (Snow & Drew, 2002) details the military and political objectives of World War II, the Vietnam conflict and the Persian Gulf War. It writes of the military technology and technique involved in all three wars. In this way, we are shown that the objectives of Vietnam were vastly different than World War II and the Persian Gulf. A comparison of these three will show that between technology, technique and policy, World War II and Operation Desert Storm were clearly examples of hyperwar while the Vietnam War was not.

In the Combat Zone (Neillands, 1998) retells the history of Special Forces combat starting in 1945 and leading up to the present. History through this book shows that as technology has improved, so has the speed of warfare increased proportionally. Special Forces' doctrine includes the mantra of speed and maneuverability. They illustrate how as speed and maneuverability increase, so does a military's effectiveness; an argument for the likelihood of hyperwar. In addition, Neillands illustrates how American military leaders in the Persian Gulf had realized that win the war as quickly as possible with minimum casualties, while still retaining public support would require a war pace not previously witnessed.

David W. Levy takes us through The Debate Over Vietnam and teaches us about the impact of a publicized war on the public's psyche. Levy writes that as an armed conflict endures, the public's sensitivities become degraded as do their patience. Recognizing this, decision makers and military commanders have learned that to retain the support of the populace, they must achieve military and political objectives as quickly as possible. Obviously this requires a swift and effective combat style. The lack of a specific objective, other than severe harassment, drew the war out until the American public could no longer stomach it, and at the same time, made the job of fighting the war almost impossible.

In a short article by Mark Gongloff, a CNN staff writer, Gongloff writes that the estimated cost of the first Gulf war ranges between $50 billion and $70 billion. He further estimates that the second Gulf War will run the same $50 billion range. This is a drastic decrease from the Vietnam conflict and even more so from World War II. The percentage of the United States gross domestic product (GDP) used to wage war has continued to decrease from World War II as the technology to wage hyperwar has increased. This is a clear indication that hyperwar is guaranteed in the future.

Donald M. Snow briefly discusses Vietnam in his book entitled, National Security. The major reason why the Vietnam conflict was such a disaster lay primarily in the fact that the war was never fully supported by the American people. He discusses the reasons for this and offers suggestions as to what shape future conflicts will take.

In "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War, Daryl G. Press argues that superior air power is not what won the war. Press's writings exemplify how the Persian Gulf conflict was a perfect text book example of hyperwar. To prove this, Press maintains it was only the combination of heavy air support in conjunction with superior ground troops which defeated the Iraqi army.

Inside the Civil War Center's website is located a wealth of information concerning wars ranging from the Revolutionary War

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